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A common assumption employed in most previous works on evolutionary game dynamics is that every in-
dividual player has full knowledge about and full access to the complete set of available strategies. In realistic
social, economical, and political systems, diversity in the knowledge, experience, and background among the
individuals can be expected. Games in which the players do not have an identical strategy set are hypergames.
Studies of hypergame dynamics have been scarce, especially those on networks. We investigate evolutionary
hypergame dynamics on regular lattices using a prototypical model of three available strategies, in which the
strategy set of each player contains two of the three strategies. Our computations reveal that more complex
dynamical phases emerge from the system than those from the traditional evolutionary game dynamics with
full knowledge of the complete set of available strategies, which include single-strategy absorption phases, a
cyclic competition (“rock-paper-scissors”) type of phase, and an uncertain phase in which the dominant strategy
adopted by the population is unpredictable. Exploiting the pair interaction and mean field approximations, we
obtain a qualitative understanding of the emergence of the single strategy and uncertain phases. We find the
striking phenomenon of strategy revival associated with the cyclic competition phase and provide a qualitative
explanation.Our work demonstrates that the diversity in the individuals’ strategy set can play an important role
in the evolution of strategy distribution in the system. From the point of view of control, the emergence of
the complex phases offers the possibility for harnessing evolutionary game dynamics through small changes in
individuals’ probability of strategy adoption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary games are a powerful mathematical and com-
putational paradigm to gain qualitative and quantitative in-
sights into a variety of phenomena in diverse disciplines
such as biology, ecology, economics, social and political sci-
ences [1–4]. A key success of evolutionary game theory is
the discovery of the general principles that govern the emer-
gence and evolution of cooperation, a phenomenon that seems
to contradict the principle of natural selection, which pro-
vides a convincing explanation of its ubiquity in both animal
world and human society [5–11]. In particular, in most previ-
ous works on evolutionary game dynamics, an assumption is
that each and every player participating in the game has full
knowledge about and access to the complete set of possible
strategies [12–17]. A typically studied game setting is the fol-
lowing: a number of agents interact with one another via some
kind of network topology (e.g., regular or complex), and each
agent can take on one strategy from a pre-defined strategy set
determined according to the typical individual behaviors ob-
served from real world systems, leading to classic games such
as the Prisoner’s dilemma games (PDGs) [6], the snowdrift
games (SGs) [18], and the public goods games (PGGs) [19].
Such a game system typically contains two strategies: coop-
eration and defection, where the latter is a selfish action that
usually generates immediate higher payoff [2]. A remark-
able achievement of evolutionary game theory is that it re-
solves this paradox in a counterintuitive but completely rea-
sonable way. In fact, previous works have uncovered a variety
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of cooperation-facilitating mechanisms such as reputation and
punishment [20], random diffusion [21], memory effect [22],
network reciprocity [12, 23], random noise [10, 24, 25],
success-driven migration [26], asymmetric cost [27], teaching
ability [11], and social or financial diversity [28–30]. In ad-
dition to game dynamics with two strategies (i.e., cooperation
and defection), there are also games with three or more strate-
gies, such as the “rock-paper-scissors” type of games where
any strategy has a cyclic advantage over another [31–47] and
extensions [48–56]. Studies of such game dynamics have led
to great insights into species coexistence and biodiversity in
complex ecosystems. Theoretically, methodologies from sta-
tistical physics have been used to understand complex spa-
tiotemporal game dynamics [1, 24, 25, 34, 57, 58].
In spite of its widespread use in previous works on evo-
lutionary game dynamics, the assumption that every agent
(game player) in the system has the same strategy set may
be idealized. In reality, due to the diversity in the knowledge
background and personal experience, it is only natural to as-
sume heterogeneity in individuals’ available strategy sets. It
is also possible that an individual’s strategies are affected by
his/her emotions and external factors. In addition, individu-
als playing a game may have quite different understandings
of other’s strategies. When the game players do not possess
an identical strategy set because not everyone has full knowl-
edge about the complete set of available strategies, the under-
lying game is called hypergame, a term coined by Bennett in
1977 [59]. In general, hypergame takes into account the re-
alistic situation where players’ understandings and choices of
the game strategies can be different. As a result, hypergame
dynamics are capable of modeling competitions and conflicts
in the real world more closely, leading to better and more real-
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2istic solutions than the classic game dynamics [60–62]. Dur-
ing a hypergame, an agent has his/her own knowledge base
to make judgment of the environment and determines which
strategy to use. The true payoff gained by the agent is deter-
mined by his/her current strategy versus the actual strategies
in the system. In fact, the player’s choice of action reflects
the way he/she perceives the reality and the game outcome,
which is usually not accurate. The inaccuracy in the percep-
tion can affect the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a
fundamental way, and may lead to different phenomena than
predicted by classical evolutionary game dynamics in previ-
ous works.
In this paper, we study hypergame from the perspective
of network dynamics. In spite of its importance, there has
been little previous study of evolutionary hypergame dynam-
ics. Because of the system complexity induced by the uncer-
tainties in individual agent’s understanding and choice of the
game strategies, we seek to construct the simplest possible
class of prototypical models that retain the essential features
of hypergame dynamics to uncover the underlying generic be-
haviors. In particular, we consider the system setting where
there are three possible strategies in the system. To every
agent in the system, two of the three strategies are available.
During the dynamical evolution, at any given time an agent
can use either one of the two available strategies with certain
probabilities. The probability of adopting a strategy is thus a
key (bifurcation) parameter in our model. Our computations
reveal that, as the bifurcation parameter is changed, our parsi-
monious model generates distinct and more complex dynam-
ical phases than those from the classical evolutionary game
models. In particular, there are deterministic single-strategy-
absorption phases, a “rock-paper-scissors” type phase, and
a phase of high uncertainty in which the dominant strategy
adopted by the population is unpredictable. We obtain an
qualitative understanding of the emergence of the multiple
dynamical phases by exploiting the pair approximation and
solving the mean-field master equation. A striking finding is
the phenomenon of strategy revival: the population adopting
a specific strategy can decrease and approach zero but it can
revive and dominate at later time. While qualitatively this can
be explained based on cyclic competitions among three strate-
gies, to develop a quantitative understanding is an open issue.
From the network control perspective, our finding that a slight
change in the bifurcation parameter can completely overturn
the relative advantage between the strategies suggests that the
complex game dynamics can be harnessed through small per-
turbations to the parameter.
II. EVOLUTIONARY HYPERGAME MODEL
To construct a parsimonious model of evolutionary hyper-
game dynamics, we begin with the generalized prisoner’s
dilemma game (gPDG) with three strategies: cooperation (C),
defection (D), and loneliness (L). If an agent adopts the L
strategy, he/she does not actually participate in the game but
nonetheless is guaranteed to receive a low payoff. For simplic-
ity, we use the prisoner’s dilemma game model introduced by
Nowak and May [63], which captures the essential feature of
hypergame. The payoff matrix M is given by C D LC 1 0 0D b 0 0
L σ σ σ
 (1)
Because agents have a different understanding of the com-
petition environment, during the hypergame, each agent is
able to distinguish and adopt only two of the three strategies.
For each agent, the resource is constrained, so the two strate-
gies have weights that sum up to unity. There are thus three
types of agents in the model: agents having available strate-
gies (1) C and D, (2) D and L, and (3) L and C, respectively.
For each of the three combinations, the probability of adopting
the first strategy is ρ while that adopting the second strategy
is 1 − ρ. For each agent, the strategy set is thus restrictively
mixed because there is a missing strategy. For the whole sys-
tem, there are then three distinct such strategies. Mathemati-
cally, the three strategies can be represented by the following
three vectors:
S(1) =
 ρ1− ρ
0
 , S(2) =
 0ρ
1− ρ
 ,
S(3) =
 1− ρ0
ρ
 , (2)
where rows 1, 2, and 3 indicate the adoption probabilities of
strategies C, D, and L, respectively.
In the simulations, agents are placed on a square lattice
with periodic boundary conditions. At each time step, each
agent plays gPDG with its nearest neighbors. The total payoff
gained is the sum of the payoffs from playing the game with
all its neighbors, which is given by
Un =
∑
m
unm =
∑
n,m
Sn
TMSm, (3)
where Un denotes the total payoff of agent at lattice node n,
unm is the payoff obtained by agent n while playing the game
with agent at lattice nodem,M is the payoff matrix in Eq. (1),
Sn and Sm are the strategy vectors of the two agents, respec-
tively. After obtaining the payoff, agent n with strategy Sn is
replaced by agent m with the probability given by the Fermi
rule [29]:
PSn−→Sm =
1
1 + exp[(Um − Un)/κ] , (4)
where κ measures the stochastic uncertainties (noise) charac-
terizing irrational choices.
In each dynamical realization, initially N agents with the
three types of strategies are randomly distributed in the square
lattice with equal probability, i.e., F1 = F2 = F3 = 1/3,
where Fx is defined in Eq. (5). The system evolves in time un-
til an equilibrium is reached. To be concrete, we set the game
parameters as b = 1.02, κ = 0.1, and σ = 0.25. We check
to ensure that reasonably different choices of the parameters
3FIG. 1. (Color online) Dependence of agent frequency on the bi-
furcation parameter. The system is a 70 × 70 square lattice with
periodic boundaries. The number of agents is N = 4900. The red
(medium gray), green (light gray) and blue (dark gray) curves show
the frequencies F1, F2, and F3 of the three agents versus the bifurca-
tion parameter ρ, respectively. For different values of ρ, the system
evolves into a final equilibrium state in different time T . In partic-
ular, for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.03, 0.26 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.3, 0.935 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.95, and
0.995 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, we have T = 5 × 105. For 0.3 < ρ < 0.42, the
system approaches a final state for T < 104. For other values of
ρ, the system needs T = 104 time steps to approach the final state.
The values of F1, F2, and F3 shown are the results of averaging
over 100 ensembles (random realizations) for most values of ρ ex-
cept for 0.3 < ρ < 0.42, where 500 ensembles are used because of
the relatively strong statistical fluctuations in this parameter interval.
Depending on the behavior of the equilibrium strategy frequencies,
the whole parameter interval can be divided into four regions: (1)
0 < ρ . 0.03 and 0.95 & ρ < 1 (region 1), (2) 0.03 . ρ . 0.3
(region 2), (3) 0.3 . ρ . 0.4 (region 3), and (4) 0.4 . ρ . 0.95
(region 4)
.
lead to qualitatively identical behaviors from the simulations.
The adoption probability ρ is a key parameter in the system,
which is chosen as the control or bifurcation parameter.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. The equilibrium state
The equilibrium frequency of the restrictively mixed strat-
egy S(x) (x = 1, 2, 3) on a square lattice of N nodes is given
by
Fx =
N∑
n=1
I(Sn, S
(x))
N
, (5)
where Sn denotes the strategy of agent at lattice node n and
I(Sn, S
(x)) is an indicator function [I(Sn, S(x)) = 1 for
Sn = S
(x) and I(Sn, S(x)) = 0 otherwise]. We use 100
random simulation realizations to obtain the value of Fx. Fig-
ure 1 shows the frequencies F1, F2, and F3 associated with
the strategies S(1), S(2), and S(3), respectively, versus the pa-
rameter ρ. In different regions of ρ value, the frequencies ex-
hibit dramatically different behaviors. Specifically, for ρ & 0,
S(1) dominates the entire population, while the frequencies of
S(2) and S(3) are essentially zero. As ρ is increased, a sharp
reduction in F1 occurs, leading to an increase in the values
of both F2 and F3. At this point, the system enters into a
state in which strategies coexist with similar frequency val-
ues. When ρ reaches the value of about 0.3, the value of F1
becomes effectively zero, while those of F2 and F3 alternate.
For ρ ≈ 0.4, F2 peaks, indicating that S(2) now dominates
the system. With a small increment in the value of ρ, S(1) be-
comes dominant, after which the system remains in the S(1)-
absorption state for a large range of the ρ value until about
ρ ≈ 0.94 when the gradual increase and decrease in the val-
ues of F2 and F1, respectively, drive the system into an S(2)-
absorption state at ρ = 1. We thus see that, as ρ is changed,
the system shows highly complex behaviors with distinct evo-
lutionary patterns. For example, one strategy may have supe-
rior advantage over the others in some parameter region but
may lose appeals completely in other regions. The phase tran-
sitions associated with most of the dramatic changes in the
system dynamics are abrupt. This numerical finding indicates
that hypergame dynamics can be much richer than conven-
tional game dynamics with pure strategies.
For convenience, we use different colors to denote the four
regions with qualitatively different behaviors (i.e., different
phases), as shown in Fig. 1. From the model setting, we see
that each of the three strategy vectors can get infinitesimally
close to another for ρ → 0 or ρ → 1: S(1)|ρ→0 → S(2)|ρ→1,
S(2)|ρ→0 → S(3)|ρ→1, and S(3)|ρ→0 → S(1)|ρ→1, providing
an explanation for the similarities in the behaviors of F1, F2,
and F3 for ρ → 0 and ρ → 1. For this reason, the regions
corresponding to ρ→ 0 and ρ→ 1 are marked with the same
color.
B. Transient behaviors
The transient behaviors that the system exhibits before ap-
proaching the equilibrium reveal more about the hypergame
dynamics than the equilibrium itself. For example, in region 1
(0 < ρ . 0.03 and 0.95 & ρ < 1), there are two restrictively
mixed strategies: S(1) and S(3) on the left side of ρ = 0 (or
S(2) and S(3) on the right side of ρ = 1), where the strategy
with a stronger defective weight gains evolutionary advantage
over the one with more cooperative weight while the third
strategy disappears long before the equilibrium is reached, as
shown in Fig. 2(a). This is due to that, when the value of ρ is
near zero or unity, the restrictively mixed strategies are simi-
lar to the pure strategies in traditional game dynamics, where
the defective strategy dominate on networks with a homoge-
neous topology due to fluctuations and the finite size effect.
In this case, the third strategy has little chance to lead to high
payoff and would be eliminated quickly, so the final state is
the coexistence of two restrictively mixed strategies. In re-
4FIG. 2. (Color online) Transient behaviors associated with hyper-
game dynamics. (a-d) Transient behaviors in the evolution of the
restrictively mixed strategies for ρ = 0.001 (in region 1), ρ = 0.2
(in region 2), ρ = 0.31 (in region 3) and ρ = 0.7 (in region 4), re-
spectively. The red (medium gray), green (light gray), and blue (dark
gray) curves represent the fractions of S1, S2, and S3, respectively,
where T is the number of evolution time steps. The results from all
four panels are from a single realization of the system. The system
parameters are the same as those in Fig. 1.
gion 2 (0.03 . ρ . 0.3), the final state is the coexistence of
all three restrictively mixed strategies. In this case, no strategy
can be eliminated, as shown in Fig. 2(b). The rapid increase in
the frequency of S(2) for ρ close to 0.1 indicates that a slight
increment in ρ can reactivate the strategy S(2) and a small
amount of defection can lead to a substantial increase in the
evolutionary fitness. As the value of ρ approaches 0.3, the
strategy S(2) becomes relatively dominant, while the strate-
gies S(1) and S(3) approach extinction, as shown in Fig. 2(c).
As ρ passes through a certain threshold value, the system en-
ters into region 3 (0.3 . ρ . 0.4), in which the transient be-
havior can be complicated but the equilibrium falls into only
one of two states: the S(2) or the S(3) absorption state. This
means that a single strategy always wins, either S(2) or S(3).
The frequencies of S(2) and S(3) shown in Fig. 1 are ensem-
ble averaged values of the number of agents in the S(2) and
S(3) absorption states, respectively, where a single realization
leads to a state with only one strategy: S(2) or S(3). Strikingly,
before the equilibrium is reached, S(1) and S(3) enter into a
nearly extinction state, where their frequencies are so low that
random fluctuations can eliminate one of them. However, if
S(1) becomes extinct, S(3) will take over the entire system.
Figure 2(c) also shows the dramatic change in the frequency
of S(3). The coexistence of the three strategies lasts longer
for a larger network, so S(1) and S(3) are more resilient to
random fluctuations. In region 4 (0.4 . ρ . 0.95), S(1) take
over after it wins the competition with S(2), while S(3) sur-
vives only in the first few time steps. The final state is one
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Actual fractions of cooperation, defection,
and loneliness. These fractions are denoted by rC , rD , rL, respec-
tively, which depend on the value of ρ in a somewhat complicated
manner. However, there are parameter regions in which cooperation
dominates, e.g., 0.5 . ρ . 0.95. Simulation parameters are the
same as those in Fig. 1.
dominated by S(1).
C. Fraction of cooperation
The fraction of cooperation is a more intuitive character-
izing quantity of the system dynamics. Figure 3 shows the
actual fractions of cooperation, defection, and loneliness ver-
sus ρ. While the dependence of the fraction of cooperation on
ρ is complicated, there are parameter regions in which coop-
eration dominates, e.g., 0.5 . ρ . 0.95, For ρ ≈ 0.95, the
fraction of cooperation is nearly one.
D. Evolution pattern on lattice and strategy revival
To further understand the coexistence of strategies for val-
ues of ρ in distinct dynamical regimes, we compute the pat-
terns of the equilibrium coexistence states on the lattice, as
shown in Fig. 4. In region 1, on the right side of ρ = 0, be-
fore an equilibrium state is reached, a typical pattern is that
S(3) forms small but relatively stable clusters with irregular
boundaries distributed evenly on the lattice. In between the
clusters is S(1), as shown in Fig. 4(a). A similar phenomenon
occurs on the near left of ρ = 1 for strategies S(2) and S(1).
In region 2, S(1) and S(3) form large clusters with regular
boundaries, while S(2) acts as the background of those clus-
ters, as shown in Fig. 4(b). Frequent strategy transitions occur
on the boundaries. For example, on the boundary between
S(1) and S(2), the probability of S(1) transforming into S(2)
is higher than that of the transformation in the opposite direc-
tion. On the boundary between S(2) and S(3), S(3) is more
5(a) (b)
(c) (d)
FIG. 4. (Color online) Snapshots of typical lattice configuration
for different ρ values. (a-d) Snapshots of self-organizing patterns
on the lattice associated with equilibrium coexistence of S(1) [red
(medium gray)], S(2) [green (light gray)], and S(3) [blue (dark gray)]
for ρ = 0.01, 0.35, 0.65 and 0.99, respectively. Other parameters are
b = 1.02, σ = 0.25, and K = 0.1. The lattice size is 400× 400.
likely to replace S(2), and on the boundary between S(1) and
S(3), S(1) is more likely to exclude S(3). This interaction pat-
tern is effectively that of a cyclic (rock-paper-scissors - RPS)
game. Closer to region 3, the frequencies of S(1) and S(3)
in the equilibrium states decrease continuously, indicating the
possible occurrence of a region in which only S(2) exists as ρ
is increased. However, this cannot occur for the reason that, in
region 3, the existence of S(3) is robust, as shown in Fig. 4(b).
In particular, in this parameter region, for a long period of
time, the transient evolution patterns of the three strategies are
similar to those associated with the RPS-like game in which
all three strategies coexist. Surprisingly, after a long time
evolution, S(1) or S(3) can suddenly disappear as their fre-
quencies approach zero, which breaks the symmetry: if S(1)
becomes extinct first, S(3) would eventually take over the en-
tire network since S(3) is more likely to replace S(2). Like-
wise, if S(3) disappears before S(1), the S(2) absorption state
will finally be realized, since there is a higher probability for
S(2) to exclude S(1). The emergence of distinct equilibrium
states, namely the S(2) or the S(3) absorption state, depends
on which strategy [S(1) or S(3)] becomes extinct first. In re-
gion 4, there is no clustering behavior, and S(1) takes over the
entire lattice rapidly. (See Supplementary Videos [64] for a
vivid presentation of the different evolution processes.)
Figure 5 shows a concrete example of the striking phe-
nomenon of strategy revival: S(3) takes over the entire lat-
tice system even when it has become almost extinct at a time
(in region 3). In particular, Fig. 5(a) shows that the system
can reach a state in which there is only a single S(3) clus-
ter of extremely small size in contact with a small size S(1)
cluster. Figures 5(d-f) show the evolution pattern after the
state in Fig. 5(c) has been reached. We see that, the smaller
S(1) cluster first collapses into several components and the
part still in contact with S(3) disappears, leaving a cluster of
Index of structure 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1
2 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S2
3 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S3
4 S1 S1 S1 S1 S2 S1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
729 S3 S3 S3 S3 S3 S3
TABLE I. Indexing scheme for the six neighbor structures
S(3) surrounded by S(2) only, while the other S(1) regions are
surrounded by S(2). The S(1) and S(3) clusters become well
separated, leading to the dominance of S(3): S(1) would even-
tually be replaced by the surrounding S(2). When no S(1) is
left, no matter how few S(3) holders there are, they will ex-
clude all the S(2) holders and overturn the whole square lattice
into the S(3) absorption state. Without the separation, S(3)
would be completely excluded by S(1) at certain time. In this
case, when there are only S(1) and S(2) left, S(2) will take
over by excluding all S(1). This is the mechanism by which
the S(2) absorption state is generated.
Figure 6 shows that the phenomenon of strategy revival can
also occur in networks with a more complex structure than a
regular lattice. In particular, the networks in Figs. 6(a-c) are
constructed from a regular square lattice with three different
percentages of link rewiring to generate long range random
links - they are small world networks. There is strategy revival
in all three networks, in spite of the increase in the time for the
system to reach the state in which the strategy S(1) is extinct
and eventually replaced by the strategy S(3). The time can be
reduced by increasing the average degree of the network, as
exemplified in Fig. 6(d).
To better visualize the spatiotemporal evolution of patterns,
we provide four Supplementary movies [64].
E. Emergence of a dominant state
Figure 7 shows the frequencies of the three restrictively
mixed strategies versus the control parameter ρ. There ex-
ist parameter regions where one of the strategies dominates.
For 0.32 . ρ . 0.4, the dominant strategy can be either S(2)
or S(3). The frequencies also depend on the system size. For
small systems, the frequency values for S(2) and S(3) (green
and blue curves) oscillate about the value of 0.5 as ρ is var-
ied in the interval. There are three distinct points of ρ at
which the two probabilities are equal. As the system size is
increased, there exists only one such value of ρ. For example,
for ρ ∈ [0.32, 0.36], the probability for S(3) to be dominant
increases with system size. For ρ ∈ [0.36, 0.4], S(2) will dom-
inate for relatively large systems.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Strategy revival. (a,f,g,h,i) For ρ = 0.35, the patterns of S(1) [red (medium gray)], S(2) [green (light gray)], S(3) [blue
(dark gray)] on the square lattice of size 400× 400. (b-e) Magnification of the patterns at different time. Other parameters are the same as in
Fig. 4.
IV. THEORY
A. Modeling of interaction configurations and pair
approximation on interaction motifs
Methods of theoretical analysis of the evolutionary dynam-
ics on square include the mean-field theory [24] in combi-
nation with pair approximation [58, 65, 66] and the master
equation [67]. To develop a theoretical understanding of com-
plex dynamical behaviors as exemplified in Figs. 1-4, we take
the mean field/pair approximation approach. To enumerate
the possible pairwise interactions, we assume that each strat-
egy exists in the clusters of the agents adopting that strategy
(Fig. 4), so the interactions (strategy transitions) occur only
at the boundaries of the clusters between different strategies.
Figure 8(a) shows the typical configurations of pair interac-
tions on a square lattice, where the two focal nodes are sur-
rounded by six other nodes, and each of the eight nodes can
adopt any of the three strategies. However, the boundaries be-
tween the clusters of different strategies typically contain two
distinct strategies only, which can be empirically verified via
the statistics of the strategy distribution configurations of the
eight-node motif.
For two clusters with regularly shaped boundaries, there are
altogether six typical configurations of strategies on the eight-
node motif, as shown in Fig. 8(b). The focal node on the left
and its left neighbor can be assumed to have the same strat-
egy, as they belong to the same cluster. The upper and lower
neighbors of the focal node can have the same strategy or the
strategy of the other focal node on the right, which is different
from that of the left focal node. Similarly, the focal node on
the right and its right neighbor are in the same cluster and thus
have the same strategy, while its upper and lower neighbor can
choose to have either of the two strategies freely. Due to the
fact that the payoff of each focal node depends only on the
number of its neighbors in each type of two strategies, sym-
metric configurations are regarded as the same. Consequently,
there are only six distinct cases, which are denoted as config-
urations (1-6) in Fig. 8(b). For boundaries with an irregular
shape, the left (or right) neighbor of the left (or right) focal
node on the motif may have a different strategy. Accordingly,
there are three additional configurations, denoted as cases (7-
9) in Fig. 8(b). Given two distinct strategies, S(x) and S(y),
the payoffs of the two focal nodes in each of the nine configu-
rations can be calculated. Furthermore, under the assumption
that the nine configurations occur with equal probability, the
average payoff of each focal node can be obtained, leading to
the probability PS(x)→S(y) of a focal node to replaced by its
opponent focal node, namely, the probability for the strategy
of a focal node to be excluded by that of the other focal node.
To gain insights, we study the statistical distributions of dis-
tinct strategy configurations, with results shown in Fig. 9. The
coding scheme of the six-neighbor structures is shown in Ta-
ble 1. We see that the green dots occur most frequently at the
cluster boundaries, indicating that the boundaries are mostly
7FIG. 6. (Color online) Persistence of strategy revival in small world
networks. (a-c) The small world networks are generated by randomly
rewiring 1%, 1.5%, 2% of the links of the square lattice, respectively.
In all cases, there is strategy revival, in spite of an increase in the time
that it takes for it to occur. This time can be reduced by increasing
the average degree of the network, as shown in (d) for 〈k〉 = 8. The
network size for (a-d) is 160000. The value of the parameter ρ is
0.35 for (a-c) and 0.325 for (d). All other parameters are the same as
in Fig. 5.
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Frequency of a dominant state. The fre-
quency values for the system to exhibit an S2 or an S3 dominant
state. All data points are the result of averaging over 500 statisti-
cal ensembles. The red (medium gray), green (light gray), and blue
(dark gray) curves represent S1, S2, and S3, respectively. (a-d) The
frequencies of S2 and S3 for a 70 × 70, 200 × 200, 250 × 250,
and 400 × 400 lattice, respectively. Periodic boundary conditions
are used.
FIG. 8. (Color online) Boundary structure of clusters and agents in
an eight-node motif. In (a), the red (dark gray), green (light gray),
and blue (medium gray) nodes represent the target agent, the op-
ponent node, and the neighbors of this pair of nodes, respectively.
(b) The cluster boundary structure, where there are two types of
agents. The upper part of the panel appears on the boundary of the
large cluster, while others arise on the boundary of the small cluster.
The boundaries of the various clusters typically contain two types of
agents. The red and green nodes in (b) represent two types of agents.
between two types of agents. The most frequently occurring
boundary structures are those shown Fig 8(b). From Fig. 4, we
see that there are more small clusters for ρ = 0.01 or ρ = 0.99
than for ρ = 0.35. The six large cluster boundary structures
appear more often for ρ = 0.35. For ρ = 0.01, the frequen-
cies of S(1) and S(3) are larger than that of S(2). There are
many more boundary points between S(1) and S(3) than any
other combinations of agent pairs. Based on the two types of
agent boundaries and the nine kinds of cluster boundaries, we
can exploit the mean field theory (below) to calculate the the-
oretical transfer probability for any type of agents and predict
their frequencies.
The various probabilities of strategy adoptions can be cal-
culated by resorting to the pairwise interaction approxima-
tion. For each of the nine strategy distribution configura-
tions on the eight-node interaction motif in Fig. 8, the pay-
offs of the two focal nodes with strategies S(x) and S(y) are
U
(1)
x = (uxx + uxy) + 2uxx, U
(1)
y = (uyy + uyx) + 2uyx,
U
(2)
x = (uxx+uxy)+2uxx, U
(2)
y = (uyy+uyx)+uyx+uyy ,
U
(3)
x = (uxx+uxy)+uxx+uxy , U
(3)
y = (uyy+uyx)+uyx+
uyy, U
(4)
x = (uxx+uxy)+2uxx, U
(4)
y = (uyy+uyx)+2uyy ,
U
(5)
x = (uxx+uxy)+uxx+uxy , U
(5)
y = (uyy+uyx)+2uyy ,
U
(6)
x = (uxx + uxy) + 2uxy , U
(6)
y = (uyy + uyx) + 2uyy ,
U
(7)
x = (uxx+uxy)+uxx+uxy , U
(7)
y = (uyy+uyx)+2uyx,
U
(8)
x = (uxx+uxy)+2uxy , U
(8)
y = (uyy+uyx)+uyx+uyy ,
U
(9)
x = (uxx+uxy)+2uxy , and U
(9)
y = (uyy+uyx)+2uyx,
where (x, y) = 1, 2, 3 but x 6= y. The quantities uxx, uxy ,
uyx, and uyy denote the payoffs of one focal node with strate-
gies S(x), S(x), S(y), S(y) against an opponent node with
strategies S(x), S(y), S(x), and S(y), respectively. The quan-
tity U (i)x (or U
(i)
y ) stands for the total payoff obtained by the
focal node with strategy S(x) (or S(y)) in configuration i in
8FIG. 9. (Color online) Statistical distribution of distinct strategy configurations. (a-i) Counts of every neighboring structure from simulation
data, where the red (medium gray), green (light gray), and blue (dark gray) dots represent the cases where there is only one type, two types,
and three types of agents within the six neighbors [Fig. 8(a)], respectively. The values of the parameter ρ are: ρ = 0.01 for (a-c), ρ = 0.35
for (d-f), and ρ = 0.99 for (g-i). The distinct boundary structures are: target agent S(1) versus opponent agent S(2) (a,d,g), S(1) versus S(3)
(b,e,h), and S(2) versus S(3) (c,f,i). For each panel, the structure index is an encoding of the six neighbors in Fig. 8(a), where are 729 such
combinations. All data points are the result of taking the average between time steps 251 and 300. The lattice size is 400× 400.
the games with its four opponents. Accordingly, the proba-
bility for a focal node with strategy S(x) to be replaced by its
opponent focal node with strategy S(y) can be calculated as
PS(x)→S(y) =
1
1 + exp[(〈Uy〉 − 〈Ux〉)/K] , (6)
where 〈Ux〉 = 1/9 ·
∑9
i=1 U
(i)
x and 〈Uy〉 = 1/9 ·
∑9
i=1 U
(i)
y .
The pairwise interaction based picture suggests that the re-
placement probability PS(x)→S(y) can in fact be regarded as
an approximation of the strategy transformation probability
on the square lattice. Figure 10(a) shows the interdependence
between PS(x)→S(y) and ρ, where x, y ∈ [1, 2, 3]. We see that,
for ρ < 0.4 (regions 1, 2, and 3), the values of PS(1)→S(2) ,
PS(3)→S(1) , and PS(2)→S(3) are all above 0.5, indicating the
following RPS mechanism: S(2) excludes S(1), S(1) drives
out S(3), and S(3) precludes S(2). For 0.495 < ρ < 0.96, we
have PS(1)→S(2) < 0.5, which means PS(2)→S(1) > 0.5, so
S(1) actually ousts S(2) in this case. Since PS(3)→S(1) ≈ 1,
S(1) eliminates both S(2) and S(3), and this explains the dom-
inance of S(1) in region 4. Our pair approximation method
thus provides an understanding of the qualitative behavior of
the system in a wide parameter range through local interac-
tions.
9FIG. 10. (Color online) Predictions of mean field/pair approxima-
tion theory. The replacement probability between any two types of
agents and the frequency of every type of agents as predicted theoret-
ically, where the latter is calculated from the mean field theory based
on the former. (a) Theoretically predicted replacement probability
based on the nine boundary structures in Fig. 8(b). Each point is the
average value of the replacement probability from the nine bound-
ary configurations. The green (light gray), red (medium gray), and
blue (dark gray) curves are the probabilities of state S(1) replaced
by S(2), of S(3) replaced by S(1), and of S(2) replaced by S(3), re-
spectively. (b) The mean-field predicted frequency of every types of
agents, where the red (medium gray), green (light gray), and blue
(dark gray) curves are the frequencies of S(1), S(2), and S(3) type
of agents, respectively, and every point is the average value of the
last 500 time steps of total 10000 mean-field simulation steps. The
incremental step in ρ is 0.005.
B. Mean-field theory
From a pairwise interaction based microscopic analysis of
the replacement probability, the behaviors of the hypergame
dynamics on a global scale can be understood quantitatively.
In terms of the mean field theory, the frequencies of the three
strategies in the system are governed by the following master
equation
dF1
dt
= [PS(2)→S(1) − PS(1)→S(2) ] · F1F2 (7)
+ [PS(3)→S(1) − PS(1)→S(3) ] · F1F3,
dF2
dt
= [PS(1)→S(2) − PS(2)→S(1) ] · F1F2
+ [PS(3)→S(2) − PS(2)→S(3) ] · F2F3,
F3 = 1− F1 − F2,
where F1, F2, F3 are the frequencies of S(1), S(2), and S(3),
respectively. The numerical solution of the master equation
group gives estimates of the frequencies of the three strate-
gies. A comparison between Figs. 1 and 10(b) reveals that
our mean-field calculation captures the essential dynamical
behavior of the system in a wide range of parameter ρ (regions
2 and 4 as well as the right side of region 1). For ρ < 0.445,
the behaviors of F1, F2, and F3 from the mean-field theory
coincide with the behavior of the real system in region 2, the
RPS-like state, almost exactly. For 0.445 < ρ < 0.495, the
dominant behavior of S(2) is similar to that in the ending part
of region 3. For 0.495 < ρ < 0.96, the dominance of S(1)
is well reproduced by the theory. For ρ > 0.96, the numer-
ically observed advantage of S(2) is reproduced. The tran-
sition points between the various regions are determined by
the points where the probabilities PS(x)→S(y) cross the line of
PS(x)→S(y) = 0.5 in Fig. 10(a) as ρ increases, due to the flip
over of the “predator-prey” relation between S(x) and S(y).
Our mean field theory fails to predict the behaviors in re-
gion 3, where the equilibrium state can be the absorption state
of two strategies. There are two reasons for this: extremely
long transient time and finite size effect. Firstly, to predict
which strategy would take over according to the evolution pat-
tern even after a very long simulation time (a typical transient
time is 0.5 × 106 time steps) is not feasible, since it is not
possible to determine which strategy would die first when the
number of critical time steps determining the fate of a strat-
egy is negligibly small. Our numerical simulations show that,
even if the frequency of one strategy, S(1) or S(3), approaches
zero, revival at later time can occur with a high probability.
Toward the right end of region 2, F1 and F3 are close to zero
and, as ρ is increased, there comes a point at which one of fre-
quencies actually becomes zero so that the system enters into
region 3. Secondly, calculations with different lattice sizes
reveal that the absorption state emerges earlier in smaller lat-
tices, and the critical ρ value separating regions 2 and 3 in-
creases with the lattice size. This implies that a finite-size ef-
fect plays the role of eliminating S(1) or S(3) to generate the
one-strategy dominant state. Fluctuation effects are more se-
vere in smaller lattices, so S(1) may become extinct or S(1)
and S(3) clusters may be separated spatially with a higher
probability.
V. DISCUSSION
In most existing works on evolutionary game dynamics on
networks, a basic assumption is that the set of possible strate-
gies is common to all players in the system [12–17]. This
assumption is reasonable for a variety of real-world phenom-
ena and, in certain cases, makes possible a deep mathemati-
cal understanding of the game dynamics. The consideration
motivating our work is that, in the real world, there can be
situations where this assumption is not accurate. For exam-
ple, in a social network, the individuals can have different
backgrounds of knowledge, financial status, and experience.
It is then conceivable that the strategy sets available to differ-
ent players may not be identical. To investigate hypergame
dynamics on networks is technically quite difficult, and such
studies are still rare in the literature. We are led to consider the
simplest setting of three available strategies with any player’s
access to two (restrictively mixed-strategies). Even for the rel-
atively simple setting, a mathematical treatment is not feasi-
ble: we thus rely on a combination of numerical computations
and physical reasoning based on the pairwise interaction and
mean field approximations to gain insights into evolutionary
hypergame dynamics on regular networks.
We find a variety of dynamical behaviors and equilibrium
states, including states in which most players use one strategy
(one dominant strategy) and those where players use multiple
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strategies (coexisting strategies). There are parameter regions
in which the equilibrium frequencies of the strategies are com-
pletely predictable (e.g., regions 1, 2, and 4 in Fig. 2), but there
is also a region of unpredictability (region 3). We also uncover
equilibrium states characteristic of those from cyclic compe-
tition dynamics, e.g., RPS-like states. A striking phenomenon
is that, a nearly extinct strategy can revive and dominate the
whole system. Qualitatively, this may be understood as a con-
sequence of the unpredictability: in a parameter region where
prediction of the system’s asymptotic state is ruled out, there
can be transitions from the RPS-like state. In particular, start-
ing from an RPS state, if the advantage of one strategy keeps
growing and wins more and more agents, the living space of
the other two strategies would be suppressed. At a certain
point, the coverage of the two weak strategies would be so
low that random fluctuations would remove one of them. If
the remaining strategy is a prey of the strong strategy, the sys-
tem would be dominated by the strong one. However, if the
remaining strategy of the two weak ones is the prey of the ex-
tinct one, then regardless of its weakness, it would eventually
overturn the entire population. A quantitative understanding
of this phenomenon is lacking at the present.
We also find that, in hypergame of the prisoner’s dilemma
type, self-organization of cooperation can be promoted. For
example, as the parameter ρ is increased, the probability of
cooperation can increase monotonically and reaches the value
of close to unity (Fig. 3). Comparing with the traditional pris-
oners dilemma game with loneliness [34], in our hypergame,
it is not necessary for voluntary participation to create a cyclic
dominance of strategies to promote cooperation.
Our work demonstrates that the diversity in the individu-
als’ understanding of the environmental strategies can play an
important role in the evolution of strategy distribution on a
global scale, and it can generate behaviors that are fundamen-
tally different from those from the traditional explicit-strategy
game dynamics. The basic parameter ρ in our model, the
probability of adopting a strategy, is key to generating the
various complex dynamical behaviors. This parameter in fact
measures the fraction of each pure strategy within the restric-
tively mixed strategy, whose changes drive the system into
dramatically different equilibrium states. Our study reveals
that a slight change in the fraction may completely overturn
the relative advantage between the strategies, suggesting that
the game dynamics can be manipulated through small changes
in the parameter. This opens a door to controlling evolution-
ary hypergame dynamics.
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